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INTRODUCTION
Imagine this thought experiment:
A new procedural rule caps the raw number of judicial opinions that an
appeals court can publish every year. The new cap is roughly half of what
the court was publishing before.
As this court’s judges begin to triage their opinion-writing, which types
of opinions will they continue publishing? Which will they give up? Will
the court more readily forgo publishing its affirmances, which are often
“easy cases”? Will it nonetheless strive to continue publishing its reversals,
which are often “hard cases”—and which offer the lower courts more
urgently needed guidance?
Once the rule takes effect, less case law will be made—but which topics
will be most affected? Which subject areas will turn out to be higher or
lower priorities for this common law court?

Strange as it might seem, such a policy shock in fact occurred. In an
unprecedented move,1 the Illinois Supreme Court in the mid-1990s imposed
hard caps on the state’s appeals courts, drastically reducing the number of
opinions they could publish,2 while also narrowing the formal criteria for
1 See Randall Samborn, Judges in Illinois Told To Be Brief, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 1994, at A6 (“In
an effort to stanch the flow of an ‘avalanche’ of state appellate court opinions, the Illinois Supreme
Court has ordered what appears to be unprecedented limits on the number of published opinions
and their lengths . . . . Staff members from the . . . National Center for State Courts and the
American Bar Association’s Judicial Administration Division said they believed the limits are the
first of their kind.”).
2 Among the five regional districts of the Illinois intermediate appellate courts, as Part II
details, the new caps amounted to cuts ranging from roughly one-third to one-half of prior output.
In the aggregate, the five districts’ actual reductions amounted to roughly one-half of prior output.
For a comparison of these new limits for each of the five districts and their typical prior output,
see infra Table 1. The accompanying discussion also explains the nonpublication options available
to the court and how the criteria for publication changed.
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opinions to qualify for publication.3 As Part I describes, the high court
explained that the amendment’s purpose was to reduce the “avalanche of
opinions emanating from [the] Appellate Court,”4 which was causing legal
research to become “unnecessarily burdensome, difficult and costly.”5
This unusual and sudden policy shift offers the chance to observe the
priorities of a common law court in its production of published opinions.
The method we introduce here can be seen as a sort of revealed-preferences
approach:6 when forced to choose, which types of opinions were these
courts more likely to continue publishing, and which types were they more
likely to abandon?7
Our method, which seems straightforward, has turned out to reveal
more than we expected: it has uncovered more than the simple priorities
raised in the thought experiment above. One especially surprising pattern
forces us to develop new theories about how higher-level judicial priorities—
such as a concern for outward appearances—compete for influence over
judicial choices.
3 According to the new formal criteria for publishing an opinion, whose implementation
coincided with the imposition of the numerical caps, “[a] case may be disposed of by an opinion
only when the majority of the panel deciding the case determines that . . . (1) the decision
establishes a new rule of law or modifies, explains, or criticizes an existing rule of law; or (2) the
decision resolves, creates, or avoids an apparent conflict of authority within the Appellate Court.”
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(a). By contrast, the prior criteria had also allowed publication of an opinion
when the case was of sufficient public interest, contributed to the legal literature in explaining
historical developments, or was accompanied by a concurrence or dissent. This change is discussed
further in Part I.
4 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Bilandic, C.J.,
writing in support).
5 Id. (Heiple, J., writing in support).
6 If one were to spin out the revealed preferences metaphor, one might say that we are
observing the impact of a budget shock. To take the metaphor further, one might also imagine
that the relative prices of various types of opinions could have changed due to the shift in
emphasis in the formal criteria for publication under the new rule. Details about the change in
formal criteria are presented below. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
7 To our knowledge, this is the first study to make use of such an empirical strategy. But, of
course, the general literature on judges’ publication decisions is vast, ranging from firsthand
judicial accounts to empirical studies, which even include empirical studies conducted by judges
themselves. For a small sampling of such work, see generally FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL:
COURTS, LAWYERING, AND J UDGING 154-80 (1994); LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. P OSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); RICHARD A. P OSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 75-82 (1996); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A.
Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want?: An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals,
28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518 (2012); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L.
& CONTEMP. P ROBS. 157 (1998); Carl Tobias, Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and Federal
Appellate Justice, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1171 (2002); David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial
Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2005).
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We began by constructing two datasets. As Part II explains, the first
dataset contains all cases available on Westlaw from the five districts of the
Illinois appeals courts in the time period selected for study.8 Second, to
reduce concerns about possible effects of the changing composition of the
courts over time, we identified a stable sample of judges who were members
of these courts for at least three years before the policy change and who
continued to sit for at least three years afterwards—that is, for the entirety
of the study period. Our second dataset consists only of opinions authored
by these judges.9
The new opinion-writing constraints hit these courts hard. All five
districts immediately complied, dropping below their respective caps.
Figures 1 through 10 show these dramatic drops both in the aggregate and in
each district.10 This sudden curtailment of publication is also clearly seen in
our stable sample of judges.11 To see which types of cases the judges
prioritized for publication, we divided the data between civil and criminal
cases, as well as between reversals and affirmances,12 and compared the
numbers and rates of published opinions among the resulting groups.13

8 These Westlaw cases contain both those that were officially designated for publication by
the courts and those that were not. (Virtually all of the latter are entries in “tables” of the reporter
or very short descriptions of a case outcome.) Our data are more fully described in Part II.
9 See infra Part II. Our use of this stable sample of judges reduces—but, of course, does not
eliminate—the possible influence of the courts’ changing composition. These judges decided cases
in panels and were surely influenced by each other’s work in other ways as well. Still, we find the
close similarity of the results in our full sample and in this more selective sample reassuring.
10 In reporting our principal findings, we emphasize those patterns that seem to be common
across districts, despite their many differences. But we also take care to identify those districts
whose reactions have unique characteristics—keeping in mind that the districts vary in their case
compositions, baseline reversal and publication rates, administrative practices, and so forth.
11 See infra Figures 3, 5. As with variations among districts, of course, variations among
judges’ reactions to the new rules and caps were also to be expected. Consider one federal judge’s
rather sharp comment that “[s]ome appellate judges like to see their own deathless prose in
published format, while others much prefer the unpublished mode, and are perfectly happy with
assignments to put out decisions for nonpublication by the dozens.” Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective
Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 924 (1986). But the aggregate
patterns in this stable sample of judges are strikingly similar to those in the full population.
12 Other breakdowns or categories are of course possible. This initial study, however, focuses
on these fundamental binaries. For an example of the finer categories that may be identifiable
based on textual parsing of the opinions, consider the data we present about a special set of
government agency cases (roughly speaking, workers’ compensation cases) in Appendix Figure 4.
We discuss these cases in Part III.
13 That is, we divided the datasets into the four categories of criminal reversals, criminal
affirmances, civil affirmances, and civil reversals. The impact of the policy shock on publications,
broken down into these four categories, can be seen in Figure 4, as well as in Table 2 and
Appendix Table 2. Part II provides further detail regarding how we identified the categories.
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We observe first that as these courts were forced to triage, they seemed
to favor civil cases over criminal cases—cutting back the publication of
opinions less among civil cases than among criminal cases. Although the
districts varied in their reactions,14 the decline in the number of published
criminal opinions (a sixty-three percent drop) was greater in the aggregate
than for civil opinions (a forty-four percent drop).15 A natural interpretation
is that a greater share of criminal than of civil opinions were deemed
sufficiently low priority to be dropped from publication: as the bar for
publication was raised—whether by the caps, by the new formal criteria, or
by both—the share of formerly publishable opinions disqualified by this
higher bar was greater among criminal than among civil cases.16
One might have guessed to the contrary (as we did) that these courts
would instead favor criminal cases for publication,17 given the importance of
public reasoning in decisions about criminal punishment.18 But predicting
the opposite would also have been sensible: criminal appeals may raise
14 One worry of the Illinois bench and bar about the new opinion-writing limits was that
different judicial districts might favor or abandon different categories of cases: “What if the judges
in the Fourth and Fifth Districts decided that the only cases which would presumptively merit
opinion would be in the areas of product liability or [the Federal Employers Liability Act?] If the
Second District, likewise, decided that [eminent domain cases] . . . would have presumptive
priority, what happens to the remainder? Practicing attorneys could easily see all of the law in a
particular area coming from one part of the state.” David R. Parkinson, More Comments on the
Recent Page and Rule 23 Ordered Opinions, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N CRIM. JUST. NEWSL. (Ill. State Bar
Ass’n, Springfield, Ill.), Dec. 1994, at 2, 3. Of course, the districts’ reactions might also vary
simply due to the differing natures of both the criminal and civil dockets that one might expect
between a densely populated urban district such as the First District, which covers much of
Chicago, and a more rural district such as the Fifth District.
15 See infra Table 2, which reports the criminal–civil comparison for all five districts
combined, as well as for each individual district. The two most populous districts—the First
District and Second District, which together cover much of Chicago and its northern suburbs—
showed a large gap between criminal and civil opinions in terms of percentage drops in opinions,
with criminal opinions dropping more than civil. So did the Fifth District, which is one of the
three smaller districts. But the remaining two—the Third District and the Fourth District—
showed small gaps. None of the districts showed a gap in favor of criminal opinions.
16 Our further analysis will complicate this seemingly simple interpretation, and a more
subtle and refined account is offered in the Conclusion.
17 Such an expectation would also align with the formal precedence that criminal appeals are
often afforded in the internal procedures of appellate courts, such as in scheduling or in the
granting of oral argument. Indeed, Illinois adheres to such a rule. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 611(a)
(stating that in the “sequence and manner of calling cases for oral argument . . . priority shall be
given to appeals in criminal cases over appeals in civil cases”).
18 Consider Judge Patricia Wald’s complaint two decades ago: “When I came onto the D.C.
Circuit in 1979, we rarely if ever disposed of a criminal appeal without an opinion; now we handle
72% that way.” Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995). Her comment suggests both that criminal appeals were once
thought to be inherently publication-worthy and that these practices or habits can change
dramatically over time.
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similar or repetitive issues, while the civil docket consists of a more varied
portfolio of areas of law, each needing an independent body of precedent.19
Also, there may have been a wider range of acceptable reasons to publish
criminal opinions before the rule change than after the new rules narrowed
the official criteria for publication.20
We encountered something more puzzling, however, in our comparisons
of reversals and affirmances. As one might have expected, these courts
seemed to favor reversals over affirmances; we observed greater drops in the
publication of opinions affirming lower court decisions than of opinions
reversing the lower court.21 By virtually any account, reversals should be
more deserving of publication: they often raise harder issues (in fact,
different judges have already disagreed), and they address issues on which
the lower courts evidently need guidance.22 No doubt many affirmances also
lay down useful precedent, and some reversals fix fact-bound errors of little
interest to case law.23 But it would not have surprised us to see the number
19 The view that criminal appeals tend not to raise precedent-worthy issues has been echoed
by at least one federal appellate judge. See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178 (1999) (“Roughly twenty-five percent of the cases on the Sixth Circuit
docket are federal criminal cases of some sort, and another thirty percent are various forms of
federal and state prisoner petitions. What can we add on these subjects that is new and
worthwhile?” (footnote omitted)).
20 We emphasize that the data do not help us distinguish between two possible (and perhaps
coexisting or complementary) reasons for a court to cut back on publication in a given category of
cases. First, some opinions may no longer merit publication due to the generally higher bar.
Second, some specific opinions may no longer merit publication because the new criteria now
exclude the rationale that would have supported publication before. For instance, the public
importance of the case was a reason for publication recognized under the old Rule 23 but not
under the new Rule 23.
21 To be clear, the findings described here are about published reversals and affirmances—that
is, about the number of reversals and affirmances chosen for publication before and after the policy
shock. These statements are not about the overall rates of reversal and affirmance, which the data
show not to be systematically affected by the rule changes. We discuss the implications of this
contrast below and in Part III.
22 While not universal, the presumption that reversals should be published is common
among appellate courts. In fact, reversal is sometimes listed as a formal criterion for publication.
See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2)(F) (stating that a decision will be published if, among other
reasons, “it reverses a published agency or district court decision, or affirms a decision of the
district court upon grounds different from those set forth in the district court’s published
opinion”). Yet as one federal appellate judge has observed, “[w]hatever the rules say, the
proportion of reversed decisions left unpublished ought to be and usually is small. However, some
circuits seem to take joy in not publishing a very high proportion of their reversals, notably the
Sixth.” Nichols, supra note 11, at 926. Judge Nichols’s view of the Sixth Circuit may be outdated,
however, or at least contested. See Martin, supra note 19, at 186-87 (“Whether a decision is a
reversal does weigh into the calculus, and we produce a relatively low number of unpublished
reversals . . . . It is fair to say that reversals or opinions with dissents are almost always published.”).
23 Cf. Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 OHIO S T. L.J.
399, 401 (1989) (“If ways could be found to identify, with economy, which cases present merely
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of published reversals barely budge and thereby see most of the policy’s
impact fall on affirmances. Instead, the data show a sizeable drop in the
publication of reversals: in the five districts taken together, less than thirty
percent of reversals were published after the policy change, compared to
over fifty percent before.
Looking into this question further led us to notice a striking and
surprising pattern, one that is found in each of the five districts, and in both
the civil and criminal dockets. Before the policy shock, published
affirmances greatly outnumbered published reversals24—yet when both
collapsed under the new constraints, they tended to land at virtually the same
level.25 Moreover, the volume of published reversals and of published
affirmances remained roughly similar thereafter, often as if tracking each
other. This pattern is evident in Figures 2 through 10.
This unexpected pattern, which appears across districts and across
categories of cases, invites hypothesis. One possibility is that the new rules
led these courts to limit publication to mainly the “hard cases”—cases in
which the law is indeterminate—and that such cases might be expected to
fall roughly half as reversals and half as affirmances. Closer analysis of the
content of these published opinions, in future work, may shed more light on
this theory.
But a rough balance is not all that we see: Figures 2 through 10 show in
many time periods—across districts, across case types, and even among
individual judges—what looks like actively managed numerical matching of
published reversals and affirmances. And tellingly, when published
affirmances and reversals are not tracking each other, affirmances outnumber
reversals among published opinions much more often than the other way
around. And so the “hard cases” theory cannot be a complete explanation,
given these additional patterns.26
The story that seems most plausible is that these courts, in choosing
which opinions to publish, did so with an eye toward appearances: even as
issues of error correction and which involve ‘lawmaking’ questions, appellate courts could easily
assign the former to a summary form of disposition and reserve the latter for extended analysis
and discussion.”).
24 The only exception was in the Fifth District, which began with affirmances already very
close to the number of reversals. See Section III.C (discussing data from the Fifth District).
Indeed, the number of affirmances closely tracked the number of reversals even before the policy shock.
25 The drop in affirmances varied greatly among the districts, as one might have expected,
thus making the regularity of the post-shock matching landings (of the number of published
reversals and affirmances) all the more remarkable. See Figures 6-10.
26 Even if some version of a “hard cases” account might allow for more affirmances than
reversals to result (among published opinions), it is not obvious how such a story would also
generate the periods of close tracking that we do observe.
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they were forced to cut back on publishing affirmances, they did not want to
publish noticeably more reversals than affirmances. They were seeking to
avoid creating the impression that the trial courts were getting it wrong
more often than right.27
In fact, by managing the balance of visible reversals and affirmances, the
appellate courts were actually countering a misimpression. The true reversal
rate was lower than what outside observers might infer based on only the
published opinions. The trial courts were in fact doing a better job than it
might have publicly seemed.
We thus suspect that we are seeing a sort of higher-order preference, or
super-priority, at work. In Part IV, we elaborate on possible motivations,
including managing perceptions of the quality of the state’s trial courts and
avoiding undue embarrassment for the trial bench. While it is by now a
familiar insight that trial judges may be reversal-averse, here we may be seeing
an appellate court show a sort of a reciprocal concern: reproach-aversion.28
The data suggest not only the presence of such a super-priority for these
courts,29 but also how this concern for appearances interacts with their other
higher-order concerns. A hierarchy among super-priorities becomes evident
when we compare the patterns of outcomes among all cases (published or
not) with the patterns among only the published opinions. The data show
that the overall reversal and affirmance numbers remain stable despite the
policy shock, even when the numbers of published reversals and affirmances
change dramatically. Compare Figure 2 with Appendix Figure 2. This
contrast is notable because, in theory, these courts could have managed
appearances in a different and troubling way: by changing the outcomes of
some cases slated for publication from reversal to affirmance. Instead, it
seems that these courts chose simply to publish more of the affirmances.
To fix ideas, imagine a contest among three stylized super-priorities:
first, reaching the desired substantive outcomes, or “accuracy” for short;
second, “appearances,” as already described; and third, “selectivity,” or
publishing only opinions useful for the case law (as the Illinois Supreme
Court instructed the appeals courts to do). The data suggest that these

27 It is common among observers to assess the quality of a court’s work by its apparent
performance on appellate review, even if such inferences have obvious shortcomings. See infra note 134.
28 One might see this as a vertical cousin of horizontal “dissent aversion.” See generally Lee
Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011) (describing “dissent aversion” among
appeals judges). On “reversal aversion” among trial judges, see generally Choi et al., supra note 7.
29 One cannot infer, of course, that any other courts—or even these same courts at a different
time—would hold this same super-priority or give it the same weight.
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courts valued accuracy and appearances over selectivity. And they sustained
the first two by sacrificing the third.
One upshot of this ordering is that there may have been spillovers
among the cases in these courts, a possibility that the Conclusion explores.
In brief, a court’s decision to publish a reversal may have depended on
which opinions it had already published so far that year, and on whether
more affirmances can be published—concerns unrelated to the true
publication-worthiness of the case at hand.
A further lesson emerges in addressing a critical question about our
assumptions: why should outward appearances be assumed to depend
mainly on published opinions? The short answer is that a vast gap in
visibility existed between published and unpublished decisions from the
Illinois appeals courts during the time period that we studied (quite unlike
today’s easy access to so-called unpublished opinions).30 Neither the name
of the trial court judge nor the reasoning of the appeals court was reported
publicly in unpublished decisions; the bound reporters and electronic
services generally stated little more than the case name and the disposition,
usually in a one-line table entry.31 This format not only obscured the nature
of the error leading to a reversal or remand, but also gave outside observers
practically no reason to consult those tables in the first place.32
Such barebones reporting of unpublished decisions virtually ensured
that outside perceptions would be based mainly on published opinions.33

30 An asymmetry in salience between published and unpublished opinions may persist even
in an era in which unpublished decisions are more readily accessible. Consider a recent episode in
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed several decisions of the Social
Security Administration (SSA) by published opinion while diverting its affirmances of SSA
decisions to unpublished dispositions. This lopsidedness apparently affected public perception of
the SSA’s work. Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner Opinion Takes Aim at Denial of Disability Benefits; Is It
a 7th Circuit Trend?, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 21, 2014), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/posner_opinion_takes_aim_at_denial_of_disability_benefits_is_it_a_7th_circu.
31 Other courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, have used
different forms of such truly unpublished opinions. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 7, at 162
(describing the Third Circuit’s “Judgment Order,” which is also termed “without-comment
disposition”).
32 For these reasons, moreover, we think that our context also departs from the folk wisdom
about federal courts today that it can be more embarrassing for a judge to be reversed in an
unpublished decision than in a published opinion. A combination of factors about the unpublished
decisions in our context—particularly not naming the trial judge and not inviting interest from
observers—probably meant that the Illinois trial judges may well have preferred an unpublished
reversal. We discuss such collegiality concerns more fully in Section III.D.
33 It is possible, of course, that some sophisticated observers would recognize that little can
be learned about overall reversal rates (save perhaps an upper bound) from observing only the
published opinions; our appearances-based account supposes that there are nonetheless important
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Meanwhile, the true reversal rate, including unpublished decisions,
remained obscure.34 It was thanks to this strong asymmetry of salience
between published and unpublished decisions that these courts could
manage outward appearances without also distorting the actual outcomes of
cases. It is common for researchers to note that published opinions are not
representative of the population of cases—but remarkably, in this episode,
the courts themselves seem to be making use of that fact.
In other words, what we may be seeing are common law courts using the
principal “medium” of judicial expression—the production of texts of
varying formats and visibilities—to convey information beyond the content
of individual opinions. The judicial medium may thus be better understood
more broadly, as allowing courts to signal to multiple audiences (with
signals of varying shades) also through the macro characteristics of the
corpus of its decisions.
I. THE POLICY SHOCK
Before turning to a closer examination of the effects of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s unprecedented limitations on the state’s appellate courts, a
brief history of the Illinois rules concerning the publication of judicial
opinions helps set the stage.
A. Earlier Forms of Decision
Since 1972, the disposition of appellate cases in Illinois’s state judiciary
has been governed by various versions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23.
As originally promulgated, Rule 23 provided the appellate courts with two
options for the disposition of cases: a circuit court could publish a
traditional precedential opinion, or for a small set of cases that were easily
affirmed,35 a nonprecedential “memorandum opinion” could suffice. But

audiences (as perceived by the appeals judges) who might not so fully discount (or who the judges
think might not discount) the informational value of the visible evidence.
34 As noted above and evident in the Appendix, the overall reversal rate is stable throughout
the time period of our study and was unaffected by the policy shock.
35 Memorandum opinions could be used for cases in which no error of law appears, an
opinion would have no precedential value, and one or more of the following circumstances exists:
(a) a judgment in a civil case is not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (b) a judgment in
a civil case entered upon allowance of a motion for directed verdict should be affirmed because all
of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant, so overwhelmingly
favors the appellee that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand; (c) in a
criminal case the evidence is not so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s
guilt; or (d) the decision of an administrative body or agency reviewed under the provisions of the
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even for those cases where the rule might apply, memorandum opinions
(known colloquially as Rule 23 orders) were rarely issued, and so the court
amended the rule in 1975 to encourage greater use of the alternative form.36
The 1975 amendment left the two disposition forms intact, but
“broaden[ed] considerably the power of the appellate courts to dispose of
cases without opinion.”37 Under the revised rules, opinions were reserved
for cases that met one of five outlined criteria;38 in cases that did not meet
this standard, the court was to issue a written order that “succinctly state[d]
the facts, the contentions of the parties, the reasons for the decision, the
disposition, and the names of the participating judges.”39 These short-form
dispositions were explicitly deemed “not precedential” and were not to be
published.40
This second iteration of the Illinois rule was consistent with similar
rules that governed the vast majority of state appellate courts41 and that
were embroiled in a controversy regarding the propriety of such
nonprecedential dispositions.42 In Illinois, that controversy came to a head
in 1983, when the Illinois State Bar Association, lamenting the loss of

Administrative Review Act and confirmed by the circuit court is not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (Committee Comments).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 The five criteria were (1) the case involves an important new legal issue or modifies or
questions an existing rule of law; (2) the decision considers a conflict or apparent conflict of
authority within the appellate court; (3) the decision is of substantial public interest; (4) the
opinion constitutes a significant contribution to legal literature by either an historical review of
law or by describing legislative history; or (5) the case included a concurring or dissenting opinion
(unless the panel unanimously decided to forgo publication). ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (Historical and
Statutory Notes).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See generally Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251 (2001) (explaining
and analyzing “the basic guidelines for publishing opinions and citing unpublished opinions in the
federal courts of appeals and the appellate courts of the fifty states and the District of Columbia”).
See also Keith H. Beyler & Clarold L. Britton, Supreme Court Rule 23: An Empirical Study, 76 ILL.
B.J. 324, 324 (1988) (explaining that “[t]he great majority of states having intermediate appellate
courts have adopted rules that limit the publication and use of the decisions of those courts”).
42 See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 757, 768-80 (1995) (arguing for the importance of opinion publication); Robert J.
Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 119, 128-145 (1994) (same). For later work on the matter, see, for example, Danny J.
Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 17,
23 (2000) (arguing that the contemporary controversy surrounding unpublished opinions is rooted
in a failure to distinguish between two kinds of precedent in opinions: analogical and rule-setting).
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precedent, called for the repeal of Rule 23.43 Responding to such public
criticism of the increased use of Rule 23 orders, the courts pulled back after
1983.44 Despite the courts’ adjustments to their practice, the controversy
persisted, and in 1988, the Illinois State Bar Association called on the state’s
supreme court to amend the rule to expand the categories of cases for which
opinions were appropriate and to increase the utility of memorandum
dispositions.45 Although little came of those proposed amendments, the
Illinois Supreme Court did decide to enact far-reaching changes to Rule 23
six years later, on June 27, 1994.46
B. The New Constraints
The resulting amendment took Rule 23 in precisely the opposite
direction of the amendments proposed by the Illinois State Bar Association
six years earlier. The 1994 amendment—which in effect “rewrote the
rule”47—enacted two main substantive changes. First, the amendment
strengthened the “presumption against disposing of Appellate Court cases
by full, published opinions” by significantly constraining (and not
expanding, as had been hoped) the range of criteria for publication.48
Second, the revised rule created a new form of nonprecedential opinion.
In addition to the familiar Rule 23 orders, the court invented an even
shorter disposition form: the “summary order.”49 The class of cases for
which summary orders were appropriate was analogous to (but larger than)
43 Beyler & Britton, supra note 41, at 325 n.3 (noting Res. of Ill. St. Bar Ass’n, 1983 Annual
Meeting ( June 24, 1983) (Agenda Item IX.A)).
44 Id. at 326 chart 3.
45 See id. at 332 (noting the text of the proposed amendments). The proposed amendments
would have expanded the categories of cases for which publication was appropriate, made
unpublished decisions reviewable by the Illinois Supreme Court, and allowed parties to seek
publication of a decision. Id. The only part of this proposal that seems to have been adopted is the
provision allowing a party to move the court to designate a decision for publication. See ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 23 (Historical and Statutory Notes).
46 Id. (Historical Notes); Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994).
47 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (Historical Notes).
48 Id. (Committee Comments). The amendment removed three of the five categories of
opinions that the rule had deemed suitable for publication. (Recall that the Illinois State Bar
Association had proposed expanding the criteria to include seven categories of opinions.) The
amended rule provided that

[a] case may be disposed of by an opinion only when a majority of the panel deciding
the case determines that . . . (1) the decision establishes a new rule of law or
modifies, explains or criticizes an existing rule of law; or (2) the decision resolves,
creates, or avoids an apparent conflict of authority within the Appellate Court.
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(a).
49 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(c).
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the set of cases for which Rule 23 orders were originally designated in the
1972 version of the rule.50 These summary orders were to consist only of “a
statement describing the nature of the case and the dispositive issues without
a discussion of the facts,” “a citation to controlling precedent” and a single
statement announcing the judgment of the court.51
The Supreme Court saved its most inventive—and most jarring—
procedural changes not for the amended text of Rule 23 but for an
accompanying administrative order known as M.R. No. 10343. Invoking its
“general administrative and supervisory authority” over the state’s lower
courts,52 the Supreme Court imposed two new limits on the Illinois
appellate courts that “raised eyebrows” and provoked “nationwide” debate.53
First, the administrative order restricted the maximum length of any
published opinion.54 In addition to encouraging shorter non-precedential
dispositions through the introduction of summary orders, the new order
mandated that published “[o]pinions shall not exceed 20 pages in length,
excluding any concurring or dissenting opinions, which shall not exceed 5
pages in length,” and included concomitant page, margin, and font size
restrictions.55
More strikingly, the administrative order buttressed the presumption
against publication through first-of-their-kind caps on published opinions.56
50

The 1994 amended rule provided that
[a] summary order may be utilized when: (1) the Appellate Court lacks jurisdiction;
(2) the disposition is clearly controlled by case law precedent, statute, or rules of
court; (3) the appeal is moot; (4) the issues involve no more than an application of
well-settled rules to recurring fact situations; (5) the opinion or findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the trial court or agency adequately explain the decision; (6) no
error of law appears on the record; (7) the trial court or agency did not abuse its
discretion; or (8) the record does not demonstrate that the decision of the trier of
fact is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Id. By contrast, see the 1972 version of Rule 23, which is quoted supra note 35.
51 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(c)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added).
52 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994).
53 Beth C. Boggs, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil Procedure, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 683, 699-700 (1995).
54 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994). These page limits
should have no first-order effect on the interpretation of our observations in the present study,
which are based on the quantity limits. However, because we find the imposition of page limits to
be a fascinating and unusual policy shock in its own right—and also because we recognize the
possibility of secondary interactions with the quantity limits studied here—we are exploring the
impact of these page limits in separate work.
55 Id.
56 See Samborn, supra note 1 (stating that the Illinois Supreme Court’s order sets “what
appears to be unprecedented limits on the number of published opinions and their lengths”); see
also Mark Hansen, Illinois Caps Appellate Opinions, 80 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (Dec. 1994) (explaining that
Illinois’s cap on opinions is “the only measure of its kind in the nation”).
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Beginning July 1, 1994, each of Illinois’s five appellate districts faced a limit
on the number of opinions it could publish annually.57 The Fourth District,
for example, was limited to publishing only 150 precedential opinions58
(compared to the 297 opinions it published in the 1993 calendar year). Table 1
provides this comparison for each of the five appellate districts.59 In total,
the new limits capped the judicial output of the Illinois appellate courts at
less than two-thirds of the number of opinions published in 1993.
Table 1: 1993 Opinions and Opinion Limits, All Districts

1st District
2nd District
3rd District
4th District
5th District

Published Opinions in
CY1993

Annual Limit Beginning
July 1, 1994

1011
430
272
297
186

750
250
150
150
150

The severity of the cuts was no accident. A desire for drastic reductions
in the number of published opinions in fact motivated the new restrictions.
Writing in support of the amended rule and new limits, Illinois Supreme
Court Justice Heiple noted that “[i]n 1993, the Appellate Courts of Illinois
published 2,195 opinions. Many of these published opinions were redundant
and lacking in precedential value.”60 Chief Justice Bilandic noted that this
“avalanche of opinions emanating from our Appellate Court has taxed the
capacity of the members of that court to read the opinions filed in all of the

57 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994). While the new limits
applied on an annual basis, they do not appear to have aligned to the calendar-year reporting
periods used by the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts. See id. (“[T]he districts of the
Appellate Court shall be limited in the number of opinions each may file annually commencing
July 1, 1994 . . . .”).
58 Id.
59 The figures for the first column in Table 1 are drawn from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL .
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE I LLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL SUMMARY—1993
[hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT].
60 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Heiple, J., writing
in support). While Justice Heiple stated that the appellate courts issued 2195 opinions in 1993, the
summed total of the first column of Table 1 yields 2196 opinions. This is due to a discrepancy in
the numbers reported in the 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59. One table in that report
shows a total of 1010 opinions in the First District for that year, whereas another table shows a
total of 1011 opinions in the First District. Id. at 108-09. We rely on the latter table because it
provides more detailed information.
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appellate districts.”61 Justice Heiple further added that this volume was
making legal research “unnecessarily burdensome” for lawyers, contributing
to increased litigation expenses.62 In the view of the supporting justices,
“[t]he new Supreme Court Rule 23 and [its] accompanying order [we]re
modest efforts to curtail the publication of unnecessary opinions and to
render those opinions that are published to be of readable length” in order
to “benefit the general public and the practicing bar” and to “elevate the
significance of . . . the appellate court.”63
Reactions to these changes, however, were not universally sanguine. Two
justices dissented from the new limits promulgated.64 Although they
concurred in the addition of the summary order disposition form, Justice
Miller, joined by Justice McMorrow, referred to the limits contained in
M.R. No. 10343 as a “mechanical, arbitrary exercise” that was “demeaning to
the appellate court, and to the public it serves.”65
Appellate judges themselves were similarly split. On the matter of the
length restrictions, some found “the page limit demeaning and chafe[d]
under the restriction.”66 Judge Dom Rizzi of Illinois’s First District, for
example, said flatly, “I don’t like it.”67 But Judge Anthony Scariano, also of
the First District, suggested that the rule “may be just what we need” to
ensure concise opinion writing.68 And Judge Calvin C. Campbell of the First
District expressed similar sentiments, noting that “[b]revity is a virtue.”69
Some judges were optimistic that the revised rule and the opinion limits
would “aid the court in disposing of the many [pending] appeals.”70 Judge
William A. Lewis of the Fifth District, for example, suggested the courts

61 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Bilandic, C.J.,
writing in support).
The interaction between the new restrictions on the appellate courts and the selection of cases
by the Illinois Supreme Court, which has discretionary jurisdiction over the majority of its docket,
presents another substantively interesting set of questions that we are exploring in separate work.
62 Id. (Heiple, J., writing in support).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. (Miller, J., dissenting).
66 Michael T. Reagan, Supreme Court Rule 23: The Terrain of the Debate and a Proposed
Revision, 90 ILL. B.J. 180, 182 (2002).
67 Hansen, supra note 56, at 36 (“I don’t like it, but if the supreme court passes a rule, I’m
going to follow it.”).
68 Id.
69 David Heckelman, Court Limits Published Appellate Opinions by Number, Size, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., June 27, 1994, at 1.
70 Id. (quoting Judge Calvin C. Campbell of the First District).
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would be able to use the new summary order form to dispose of cases “right
after hearing oral arguments.”71
But other appellate judges worried about the potential for
disproportionate impact on different areas of law. Importantly, the new
limits did not distinguish between categories of cases. That is, beyond the
revised formal criteria for publication, the supreme court provided no
further signal as to the types of cases to prioritize, even though the
appellate docket is widely varied and appeals have a variety of origins.72 As
Judge Parkinson put it,
What if the judges in the Fourth and Fifth Districts decided that the only
cases which would presumptively merit opinion would be in the areas of
product liability or [the Federal Employers Liability Act?] If the Second
District, likewise, decided that [eminent domain cases] . . . would have
presumptive priority, what happens to the remainder? Practicing attorneys
could easily see all of the law in a particular area coming from one part of
the state.73

The local bar was also less hopeful, expressing similar concerns. The
Chicago Council of Lawyers, a public-interest bar association, petitioned
the Supreme Court of Illinois to reconsider the limits, contending that the
rule would “stifle the development of the law.”74 That request was promptly
denied, less than two weeks after it was filed.75

71
72

Id. (quoting Judge William A. Lewis of the Fifth District).
Some appeals are routed through special “divisions” created within the existing structure
of some of the trial courts. See, e.g., ILL. 19TH J. CIR. CT. R. 1.03 (“The Chief Judge may
designate such divisions as he, from time to time, deems necessary . . . .”). Similar provisions
exist in the local rules of various other trial circuits in Illinois, but not all of them have exercised
this authority. Meanwhile, other appeals, such as those from claims for workers’ compensation
benefits, begin as administrative matters. See, e.g., James W. Chipman, The Impact of Rule 23 on
Administrative Law: One Agency’s Perspective, 87 ILL. B.J. 428, 428-29 (1999) (noting two possible
routes for appeals from the Property Tax Appeal Board).
73 Parkinson, supra note 14, at 3. Judge Parkinson’s concerns echo arguments favoring the
“percolation” of legal issues across jurisdictions. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON,
REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL PROCESS 47 (1986).
74 Hansen, supra note 56, at 36.
75 David Bailey, Court Stands Fast on Opinion Limits, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 15, 1994, at 1
(explaining that a petition asking for the Illinois Supreme Court to hear public comment on the
new limits was filed by several bar associations on September 2, 1994, and denied by the court on
September 14 of the same year).
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C. Implementing the Change
Despite reservations regarding the amendments, the new rules and the
limits went into effect only three days after they were officially
promulgated.76
To learn how each district implemented these drastic changes, we sought
information from representatives from each district. While we discovered
that much of the relevant institutional memory has faded in the intervening
twenty years, we have also been able to discern some broad contours of the
various districts’ implementation strategies.
Several districts employed a centralized mechanism for ensuring
compliance with the revised rules. The Fourth and Fifth Districts, for
example, employed a central “research division” to track progress toward the
district’s annual limit on a regular basis (e.g., monthly or quarterly).77 As
Judge Myerscough of the Fourth District explained, “[t]he central
monitoring of the opinions was done by our research clerk.”78
The First District likewise employed a central research division that
held a fair amount of influence over the decision to publish an opinion in a
given case.79 There, the research division was the first to examine the open
appellate docket and identify cases that might not be suitable for
publication.80 A randomly assigned judge, serving as case manager, could
also deem a case unsuitable for publication.81 Such cases would, with the
approval of the associated panel, be decided by a nonprecedential order.82
But any panel member could request to publish an opinion instead (and
such requests seem to have been generally respected by the other panel
members).83

76 That is not to say that the changes came as a complete surprise. The Third District, for
example, seems to have anticipated the amendments. “Prior to the supreme court’s amendment of
Rule 23, our court had already scrutinized the rule’s publication requirement. As a result, we
reduced the number of opinions filed by our district from 349 in 1992 to 272 in 1993.” Michael R.
McCuskey, Supreme Court Rule 23—Brief Comments on the New Changes, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N CRIM.
JUST. NEWSL. (Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Springfield, Ill.), Dec. 1994, at 3, 4.
77 E-mail from Hon. Sue Myerscough, Ill. Appellate Court, Fourth Dist., to Johanna
Hudgens (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:45 PM) (on file with authors); Telephone Interview by Ethan
Weinberg with John Flood, Clerk of Court, Ill. Appellate Court, Fifth Dist. (Oct. 16, 2013).
78 E-mail from Hon. Sue Myerscough, supra note 77.
79 Telephone Interview by Johanna Hudgens with Gino L. DiVito, Former Judge, Ill.
Appellate Court, First Dist. (Apr. 10, 2014).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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In contrast to the early determinations made by the research division or
a randomly assigned judge in the First District, the Fourth District would
decide whether to publish an opinion only after a panel had reached a
decision on the merits or even only after the circulation of a draft opinion.84
The Fourth District’s research division would occasionally suggest that a
decision be published, although the ultimate decision whether to publish
was controlled by the authoring judge and the appellate panel.85
Unlike those districts that used a centralized office, the Third District
divided its annual allotment of opinions among its judges, giving each an
individual cap and making each responsible for ensuring he or she did not
exceed the threshold.86 The chief judge apparently monitored each judge’s
output.87
Despite these varied approaches, it seems that all districts were
conservative in their publication decisions relative to the new limits. That
is, each district “over-complied” with the new caps by publishing fewer
opinions than permitted. For instance, the First District undershot its
annual cap of 750 opinions by publishing roughly 550 to 600 opinions per
year. The Second District faced a cap of 250 opinions, but published only
about 160 per year at first—before creeping up to approximately 200
opinions after three years. The district that stands out is the Fourth
District. Like the Third and the Fifth Districts, the Fourth faced a cap of
150 opinions; unlike the other two, however, it did not markedly overcomply. Rather, it hovered in the range of 130 opinions per year. This might
suggest that the Fourth District was closer to being bound by its cap than
the other districts were by theirs.88
One possible explanation for the general over-compliance is that, in
learning how to work with the new limits on publication, the districts
initially erred on the safe side.89 A complementary hypothesis might be that
the judges quickly internalized the newly narrowed criteria for publication
and applied it conservatively, perhaps with an eye on the caps, resulting in a
number of publications below the arbitrary limits set out in M.R. No.
10343. But regardless of the underlying motivation, given what we have
84
85
86

E-mail from Hon. Sue Myerscough, supra note 77.
Id.
Telephone Interview by Ethan Weinberg with Gist Fleshman, Clerk of Court, Ill.
Appellate Court, Third Dist. (Oct. 16, 2013).
87 Id.
88 But for an alternative explanation, see infra text accompanying note 133.
89 One might see the Second District’s upward crawl over time as an indication that it was
learning how to properly manage the publication limit. But it may also be telling that the First,
Third, and Fifth Districts did not show such a pattern.
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learned from court officials about each district’s implementation protocol,
there is no obvious relation between the method of implementation and the
degree of over-compliance.
II. CONSTRUCTING THE DATA
To examine the effects of the amendments to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 23 and the accompanying administrative order, we constructed two
primary datasets. The first includes all available decisions from all five
districts during our entire study period (three years before and three years
after the July 1, 1994 policy shock). The second includes only the opinions of
the judges who sat on the court for our entire study period; there were
twenty-five such judges in this stable sample.
First, with the permission and assistance of Thomson Reuters, we
downloaded all dispositions issued by the Illinois appellate courts during
our study period and available on Westlaw. We analyzed these text files
using a custom parser that collected select characteristics from each
disposition, including case type, disposition type, caption, citation, date of
decision, authoring judge, and outcome. This Westlaw data formed the basis
for our two primary datasets.
A check on the completeness of the Westlaw data is offered by the
composite statistical data available in the Annual Reports of the Illinois
Courts, which are prepared by the Administrative Office of the Illinois
Courts.90 Most notably, charts of corresponding statistics drawn from the
Annual Reports (though not reported here) mirror our own findings
described below.91
The comparison with the Annual Reports also shows that the cases
available on Westlaw (and thus in our primary data) represent a fairly
comprehensive subset of the total dispositions issued by Illinois’s appellate
courts. For example, the 1991 Annual Report of the Illinois Courts notes
that 2284 cases were decided by written opinion and 3380 cases were

90 See 1993 ANNUAL R EPORT, supra note 59, at 104-13 (separate statistical summary);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE I LL. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE TO THE SUPREME C OURT OF I LLINOIS 83-88 (contained within annual report).
91 One advantage of using our database is that in the Annual Reports, the statistics for the
year 1994 commingle data from before the effective date of the policy change, July 1, 1994, with
data from afterwards. See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. C OURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL SUMMARY—1994. More generally, our data allow us
to use finer time periods (such as half years), whereas the Annual Reports only offer yearly data.
And, of course, our data allow finer breakdowns along other critical dimensions, such as by
individual judge.
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decided by Rule 23 order.92 Thus, the appellate courts decided a total of
5664 dispositions in 1991. The Westlaw data for that year include a total of
5330 dispositions, or 94.1% of the courts’ self-reported total. Of those, 2007
cases were decided by opinion (87.9% of the 2284 total opinions reported by
the courts), and table decisions comprise the remaining 3323 dispositions (or
98.3% of the court reported total of 3380).93 Appendix Table 1 provides a full
comparison of these sources of data across the calendar years relevant for
our study period. In total, the Westlaw data include 40,301 coded
dispositions out of 43,262 registered in the Annual Reports, or 93.1% of the
reported total.94
Because the amendment to Rule 23 took effect on July 1, 1994, we used
the date of each disposition to divide our Westlaw data into half-year
periods and examined the three years on either side of the amendment.95
Thus, we examined all available dispositions issued between July 1, 1991, and
June 30, 1997.
In addition to relying on the complete data for all available cases in all
districts, we also created a second dataset. This dataset, which comprises
only those opinions that were issued by a “stable” sample of judges, is a
subset of our Westlaw data. In our analysis of each opinion downloaded via
Westlaw, we recorded the date of the decision and the authoring judge.96
Using this information, we were able to determine which judges were active
during our entire study period.97 We identified twenty-five judges who
issued opinions throughout our full study period98—that is, who issued at
92 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE I LL. COURTS, ANNUAL R EPORT OF THE I LLINOIS
COURTS —1991, at 71.
93 The Westlaw dataset treats Rule 23 orders and summary orders equivalently. We use the
term “table decision” to refer to both collectively, because the outcome is recorded in the table by
the reporter.
94 Although we obtained 40,301 total dispositions from Westlaw, our net sample consists of
34,446 dispositions, because we excluded dispositions issued outside of the three years
immediately before the policy change and the three years immediately after. That is, the net
sample excludes the first and last six months of data for the years at issue.
95 By contrast, the Annual Reports provide aggregate statistics only on a calendar-year basis.
As a result, the 1994 Report commingles data that predate the amendments with data that postdate them. Our figures report 1994 data predating the amendments as 1994H1 and data postdating them as 1994H2 (and we use similar H1 and H2 notation for all half-year intervals during
our study period).
96 Authoring judge information was available only for opinions, and not for unpublished
dispositions.
97 Using this stable sample of judges reduces concerns about composition effects due to
changing membership on the Illinois appellate courts, including shifts in the political compositions
of these courts (although we recognize, of course, that even the stable set of judges would be
sitting on panels with new colleagues).
98 Out of a total of 101 judges.
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least one opinion in each of the six half-year periods prior to the rule
change and in each of the six half-year periods after the change. We then
cross-checked this list against the lists of active judges in the Annual
Reports to verify our inferences. We were thus able to construct a second
dataset consisting of the 4350 opinions that were authored by judges whose
tenures encompass our entire study period.99
III. REVEALING PRIORITIES
Changing the rules for the publication of decisions had an immediate
effect. Figure 1 shows that all the districts in Illinois, combined, published
983 opinions in the first half of 1994. In the second half of that year, that
number was cut by more than half—to 453 opinions.100
Figure 1: Number of Published Opinions, All Districts
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

This stark drop in the number of published opinions was not due to an
overall decline in cases decided, a number which actually increased slightly
after the rule change.101 Nor could it be due to changes in the rate at which
99 This is slightly more than fifty percent of the 8659 total opinions that were issued during
our study period.
100 We obtain similar results using data from our stable sample of judges, as well as the
Annual Reports of the Illinois Courts.
101 See infra Appendix Figure 1. One can imagine reasons why: for example, opinions are
costly to write; thus, as judges began to write fewer and shorter opinions after the rule change,
they may have had additional time to address more cases.
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trial court decisions were appealed, given that these rates of appeal
remained stable during the study period.102
The rule change also does not appear to have had any noticeable impact
in the merits outcomes of cases. That is, the overall rate of reversals and rate
of affirmances remained steady (counting both published and unpublished
decisions), with no indication of any disruption at the time of the policy
shock.103 The rates of published reversals and affirmances are, however, an
entirely different story.

102 The rate of civil appeals was essentially unchanged; the rate of criminal appeals declined
very slightly over the study period, but did so steadily, without any unusual deviations at the time
of the policy change.
103 See Appendix Figure 2. Here and throughout our findings, a reversal refers to any change
to the trial court’s decision, including remands and reversals-in-part. See Jon O. Newman, A Study
of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 632 (1992) (using the same approach in a
quantitative study by a federal appeals judge).
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Table 2: Change in Published Opinions by Case Type
Before

After

Changes

All Districts

Criminal
Civil

2154
3677

790
2038

-63.3%
-44.6%

1st District

Criminal
Civil

956
1613

372
1093

-61.1%
-32.2%

2nd District

Criminal
Civil

436
653

143
344

-67.2%
-47.3%

3rd District

Criminal
Civil

291
457

91
174

-68.7%
-61.9%

4th District

Criminal
Civil

284
540

129
250

-54.6%
-53.7%

5th District

Criminal

187

55

-70.6%

Civil

414

177

-57.2%

A. Civil or Criminal?
Our basic strategy for unveiling judicial priorities is straightforward:
observe the triage.104 Which kinds of cases tended to be cut from
publication? Which kinds of cases tended to continue to be published?
Although other breakdowns of the data are possible, we chose in this initial
inquiry to examine two basic cuts: opinions in criminal versus civil cases,
and opinions that affirmed as opposed to those that reversed the lower
court. The simpler story, and where our discussion begins, is the comparison
between criminal and civil cases.
As the Introduction explains, we had predicted that the importance of
public reasoning in criminal cases would lead judges to favor those cases
when deciding which opinions to protect from the cuts. Yet, as Table 2
shows, no district sought to preserve publication in criminal cases more than
in civil cases. In the Third and Fourth Districts, the difference was small.
But the other districts cut criminal opinions by considerably more than civil
opinions. The First District (which includes Chicago) slashed criminal

104 We borrow the metaphor of triage from COFFIN, supra note 7, and Vladeck & Gulati,
supra note 7.
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opinions by nearly thirty percentage points more than it did for civil
opinions. (A former judge of the First District explained that its research
division would often handle criminal appeals.)105 The Second District,
which includes some of suburban Chicago, similarly cut criminal opinions
by twenty more percentage points than it did for civil opinions.
Overall, these courts seemed more willing to rein in publication in their
criminal dockets than in their civil dockets. There are at least two possible,
and compatible, explanations for this contrast.106 It may be that, as the
formal criteria for publication were narrowed by the amendments to Rule 23
(which emphasized precedential value, to the exclusion of other factors such
as the public importance of the case or the presence of a dissent), a larger
fraction of formerly publishable criminal opinions than of civil opinions was
now disqualified from publication. Or it may be that the rule change and
opinion limits caused the courts to internalize a generally higher bar for
publication, and the share of opinions that no longer qualified under this
new sense of publication-worthiness was greater among criminal cases than
among civil cases. Either way, during the triage, a larger share of criminal
cases than of civil cases was deemed sufficiently low-priority to be dropped
from publication.
B. Reversals or Affirmances?
The most striking pattern in the data emerges from our analysis of the
changes in the publication of affirmances and reversals. Figure 2 shows this
pattern clearly in the aggregate data, but it can also be seen in breakdowns
both by districts and by subject matter categories.
Before the rule change, there was a clear, wide gap between the number
of published affirmances and reversals: many more affirming opinions were
being published. The number of opinions published then fell precipitously
between the first and second halves of 1994 due to the policy shock. Figure
2 shows that the rule change hit affirmances especially hard.107

105
106
107

Telephone Interview by Johanna Hudgens with Gino L. DiVito, supra note 79.
These theories and others are considered in greater detail infra Section III.D.
See also infra Appendix Table 2 (showing that, by contrast, the overall ratio of all
affirmances to all reversals remained largely unchanged).
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Figure 2: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
All Districts
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But just how far did the affirmances fall? No matter their starting points,
immediately after the shock, affirmances and reversals tended to land at
almost the same levels. Moreover, from that point forward, the number of
affirmances often closely tracks the number of reversals.108 Notably, during
the times when they diverged, affirmances tended to outpace reversals,
rather than the other way around.

108 It is worth repeating that our findings here concern the publication of decisions that
affirm and decisions that reverse (and we are not making claims that merits outcomes changed, as
the data suggest that this did not occur).
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Figure 3: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
Stable Sample of Judges
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Similar results are seen in the choices of our stable sample of judges. In
the first half of 1994, this set of judges issued fifty percent more affirmances
than reversals. In the second half of 1994, they issued virtually the same
number of each. And in each successive period, the number of affirmances
exceeded but remained close to the number of reversals.
These findings are unsurprising in one sense: one ought to expect
affirmances to fall more than reversals. After all, an affirmance indicates that
the lower court handled the case correctly, suggesting little need for
guidance on the matter.109
But what is surprising is that the numbers of affirmances and reversals,
once they fell, would land so close to each other. This is especially notable
because they started off at such different quantities. This finding is no
accident of aggregation, nor is it a quirk of the twenty-five judges in our
subsample. Rather, it appears across districts as well as in our subject matter
breakdowns.

109 See supra note 48 (noting that key criteria for publication under the amended rule were
whether the opinion established a new rule of law or modified an existing rule).
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Figure 4: Number of Published Opinions by Type and Outcome,
All Districts
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Figure 5: Number of Published Opinions by Type and Outcome,
Stable Sample of Judges
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Figures 4 and 5 correspond to Figures 2 and 3, respectively, showing
changes within the distinct sets of civil and criminal cases. Evidently, the
tendency of the courts to keep the volume of published affirmances in line
with those of published reversals operates not only at the level of their total
output, but also within both the criminal and the civil dockets.110
The data thus reveal an unanticipated constraint—a sort of superpriority—that seems to have operated not only at the aggregate level, but
also within distinct categories of cases (and, as we will see, geographies).
Why this seeming super-priority is so potent is the central mystery raised
by this study. But its presence could clear up another puzzle: given the
premise that the Illinois Supreme Court’s new criteria would drive the
selection of opinions for publication, one might not have expected to see so
many affirmances survive the cut while reversals were allowed to drop as far
as they did. Reversals address issues on which appellate guidance is usually
necessary and over which judges have already reached contradictory
conclusions. Wouldn’t an appeals court, prioritizing this form of
“selectivity,” naturally protect the publication of such opinions and instead
choose not to publish affirmances?111
The possibility of a super-priority helps explain why this intuitive
expectation did not fully materialize: due to some external motivation, the
volume of published affirmances was inflated to stay close to, or above, the
volume of published reversals.
We emphasize here the possibility that affirmances were inflated, and
not that reversals were suppressed, because four of the five districts
remained under the official publication limits for most of the post-shock
study period. There was thus no formal pressure from these caps requiring
the suppression of either published affirmances or reversals (with the
possible exception of the Fourth District, where the official cap seemed
relatively closer to binding). It does remain theoretically possible, however,
to imagine that reversals were suppressed; for example, if one supposes that
the courts were setting an implicit cap for themselves only as to the
publication of affirmances, then our data could be read as showing that the
courts were then suppressing reversals to stay close to, or under, that number.

110 As we discuss below, focusing only on opinions reviewing decisions of the Industrial
Commission (which operates the state’s system for workers’ compensation claims) shows a similar
pattern. See infra Appendix Figure 4.
111 It is true that some affirmances also address difficult questions and that some reversals
simply correct factual errors that have little precedential value. Even so, one might have expected,
as a general matter, that published affirmances would be the first thing to go.
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C. The Five Districts

Because the five judicial districts in Illinois varied in their starting
points before the policy shock, in the caps assigned to them,112 and in other
characteristics such as population and case composition, we also broke down
the data by district. Aside from our desire to see how regularly this pattern
occurred from court to court, we were also concerned that the patterns
observed in the aggregate might have been unduly influenced by a single
dominant district (such as the First District, which includes Chicago) or by
a set of similar districts (such as the Fourth and Fifth Districts, which
include more rural portions of southern Illinois). In fact, the pattern
persisted across all the districts and, in some cases, even operated at the
level of individual judges.113
Figure 6: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
First District
300
Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

250

200

150

100

50

0

112 See supra Table 1 (listing the number of opinions published in each district in 1993 and the
caps that they were assigned in 1994).
113 See infra Appendix Figures 5A-5D (charting results of individual judges in the Fifth
District).
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The First District, the largest of all five districts, showed a pattern that
largely mirrored our aggregate results: a wide gap between published
reversals and affirmances in each case category prior to the rule change,
followed by a precipitous drop in published affirmances but falling only to
the level of published reversals (which also fell, but not as sharply).
Figure 7: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
Second District
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In the Second District, as in our aggregate results, the gap between
published affirmances and reversals narrowed after the rule change, but the
two categories alternated in outpacing each other.
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Figure 7A: Number of Published Opinions by Type and Outcome,
Second District
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A further breakdown of the Second District’s data into criminal and civil
dockets more clearly reveals what was happening. Figure 7A shows that, in
the Second District’s criminal cases, the number of published affirmances
closely tracks the number of published reversals in each six-month period
following the rule change. It is only in the civil docket that the court
seemed more willing to allow the number of published reversals to
noticeably exceed affirmances in some periods.
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Figure 8: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
Third District
100
Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Figure 9: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
Fourth District
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Figures 8 and 9 show that the Third and Fourth Districts also exhibited
patterns consistent with the hypothesized super-priority. In the Third
District, published affirmances were already declining before the policy
shock. The decline was apparently intentional, as this court seems to have
anticipated the changes to Rule 23.114 Nonetheless, both affirmances and
reversals dropped sharply at the moment of the policy shock. What is
notable here is not the anticipatory decline of published affirmances, but
that quantity’s sudden leveling and mirroring of the post-shock levels of
published reversals.
The results in the Fourth District also reflect key characteristics of the
dominant pattern. First, there is a sharp fall in both reversals and
affirmances at the point of the policy shock that closes the original gap
between them. Beyond that point, the number of published affirmances
tended to stay close to, or else to exceed by a small margin, the number of
published reversals.
Figure 10: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
Fifth District
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114 The Third District seems to have anticipated at least the change in Rule 23, if not the
caps and page limits in M.R. No. 10343. As Judge McCuskey of that district put it, “[p]rior to the
supreme court’s amendment of Rule 23, our court had already scrutinized the rule’s publication
requirement. As a result, we reduced the number of opinions filed by our district from 349 in 1992
to 272 in 1993.” See McCuskey, supra note 76, at 4. He also noted, however, that “a further
reduction to 150 published opinions may appear drastic.” Id.
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Like the other districts, the number of published affirmances in the
Fifth District tracks the number of published reversals. But the Fifth
District differs from its counterparts in one notable aspect: The “tracking”
behavior is not limited to the time period following the rule change. Rather,
the Fifth District seemed to have kept a fairly even balance of published
affirmances and published reversals even before the policy shock. This close
tracking throughout the study period is evident even in the publication
patterns of certain individual judges.115 By the end of the study period,
however, the close tracking seen in the Fifth District falls apart; at that
point, more than any other district, the Fifth District no longer held
published affirmances at approximately the level of published reversals.
D. Interpretations and Implications
Our observations of how the Illinois appellate courts triaged their
opinion-writing reveal not only which types of opinions the courts
prioritized for publication but also suggest what these courts saw as being at
stake in their publication choices. Our findings also suggest that these
courts understood that their “medium” of judicial expression was not
confined to the immediate content of their written opinions—but rather
extended to the visible corpus of their decisions taken as a whole.
1. Observing the Triage
Consider first the basic criminal–civil comparison. Our data show that
the share of criminal opinions deemed sufficiently low-priority to be cut
from publication under the new rules was greater than the share of civil
opinions.116 This differential ran against our original expectations; we had
predicted that the importance of public reasoning about criminal
punishment would lead the courts to more avidly protect the publication of
those opinions.117 But there were also good reasons, as noted above, to
115 See infra Appendix Figures 5A-5D (showing data for the four judges in the Fifth District
who sat during the entire study period). We must emphasize that the tracking pattern is not
evident for every individual judge—even in districts such as the Fifth District where the aggregate
numbers show a close balance throughout. (That is, idiosyncratic variations among the judges in
such a district averaged out into a clearer overall tracking pattern.) And it goes without saying that
we are not claiming that these four judges are a representative sample of the Fifth District (much
less of any other district).
116 For a refinement of this interpretation, see the discussion in the Conclusion.
117 We also knew that the Illinois courts already accorded precedence to criminal cases in
procedural matters, such as in scheduling oral arguments. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 611 (noting that in
the “sequence and manner of calling cases for oral argument[,] . . . priority shall be given to
appeals in criminal cases over appeals in civil cases”). While precedence in procedural handling
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expect that these courts might instead favor civil opinions for preservation:
These criminal appeals may have raised repetitive issues or turned on
factual matters subject to high levels of deference, whereas the civil docket
may have been more varied and thus may have raised more new or unsettled
legal issues requiring appellate explication.
It is a more obvious case that reversals should have been favored over
affirmances for protection from the publication cuts, as was observed:
Reversals present cases in which judicial colleagues have already disagreed
and on matters in which the lower courts evidently require further
guidance. Thus, reversals seem naturally more likely to survive under the
more selective standards for publication, which focus on precedential value.118
What such a simple story of priorities among types of cases cannot
easily explain, however, is the pattern seen in Figures 2 to 10: Across
districts and across categories, immediately after the policy change, the
number of published affirmances and reversals each fell from different levels
and yet landed at virtually the same place, and then stayed roughly
balanced. What could account for this unexpected, persistent pattern?
One explanation might be that such a balance is a natural byproduct of
the newly selective criteria for publication: these courts began to limit
publication to mainly “hard cases,”119 which one might expect to fall roughly
half as reversals and half as affirmances.120 We find this possibility
need not translate into selection of published opinions, we also speculated that the former might
be a proxy for a deeper priority that would so translate. For additional examples of precedence for
criminal cases in appellate procedure, see U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PLAN
FOR EXPEDITING CRIMINAL APPEALS 3 (2008) (“This court gives criminal appeals the highest
priority in screening, calendaring, and decision.”); id. (“By court policy, each judge must give
direct criminal cases priority in the preparation and publication of opinions over all other cases
except previously submitted direct criminal cases.”). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012) (“Criminal cases
on review from the States courts shall have priority, on the docket of the Supreme Court, over all
cases except cases to which the United States is a party and such other cases as the court may
decide to be of public importance.”); FED. R. APP. P. 45(b)(2) (“In placing cases on the calendar
for argument, the clerk must give preference to appeals in criminal cases and to other proceedings
and appeals entitled to preference by law.”).
118 The rule change limited publication primarily to those cases which “establishe[d] a new
rule of law or modifie[d], explain[ed] or criticize[d] an existing rule of law.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(a).
119 We use the terms “easy” and “hard” cases in the familiar sense. For a recent critical
analysis of the terminology, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749
(2013). For classic expositions, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975);
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639
(2003); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind
Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399
(1985); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887 (1987).
120 The emergence of this balance might bring the Priest–Klein hypothesis to mind. See
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
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intriguing, but it cannot be a complete account of our observations.121 The
reason is that our findings reflect more than a rough balance between
affirmances and reversals. What we seem to see, in many time periods—
across districts, case types, and even some individual judges—is a tight
tracking pattern, suggesting the active, continuous management of the
balance. Furthermore, under a basic hard cases explanation, we should also
expect deviations due to noise to favor reversals as often as affirmances—but
instead, the data show that where they diverge, affirmances outpace
reversals much more often than the other way around.
It remains possible, of course, that these courts began by largely limiting
their publications to hard cases—but also actively sought to prevent the
volume of published affirmances from falling noticeably below the volume
of published reversals. Although future work more closely analyzing the
content of these published opinions may shed more light on the extent to
which these courts were publishing mainly the hard cases,122 some further
clues from our current data also suggest that the hard cases explanation is
not the whole story.123 One might assume, for instance, that the presence of
19-20 (1984) (explaining that as the number of cases selected for trial approaches zero, a plaintiff’s
rate of success approaches fifty percent). In our setting, what is being selected is opinions for
publication, rather than cases for trial. The analogous intuition here is more easily and suitably
expressed as the possibility that what is left (after the policy shock) are the “hard cases,” which
tend to fall half as reversals and half as affirmances.
121 One might imagine other such even-split stories involving more complex mechanisms,
including strategic behavior or bargaining, but the evaluation of such hypotheses is beyond the
reach of this study. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 18, at 1374 (“I have seen judges purposely
compromise on an unpublished decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a
time-consuming public debate about what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters
go along with a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent.”).
122 We note that such a pattern is not generally evident in other contexts in which one might
expect it to operate, such as other appeals courts. See, e.g., Caseload Highlights, CT. STAT. PROJECT
(Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.), March 2007, available at http://www.ncsc.org/
Services-and-Experts/Areas-of-expertise/Appellate-justice.aspx (showing an overall thirty percent
reversal rate for decisions made by state intermediate appellate courts).
123 In addition to the incidence of separate opinions (i.e., concurrences and dissents), as
explained in the text, one might imagine several other indicators of the difficulty of a case. These
include opinion length (in words) and the number of citations contained within an opinion. Both
of these measures, however, are likely confounded by the new limits on opinion length imposed by
M.R. No. 10343. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. Yet another proxy for such hard
cases, or for cases that present questions of precedential value, may be the standard of review used
by the appellate court—but our review of a sample of published opinions suggests that the
standard is not consistently reported.
We also considered using oral argument as a signal of the relative importance or difficulty of
the legal issues at stake in a case. Unlike other jurisdictions, however, the decisions of Illinois’s
appellate courts, as reported by Westlaw, did not indicate whether oral argument was held. We
likewise considered future citations to a given opinion, but such observations would have been
confounded by the overall reduction in available citable precedent (due to the policy shock).
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a concurrence or dissent serves as a signal of a hard case.124 We found a
greater incidence of such separate opinions among reversals than we did
among affirmances—not the roughly equal incidence that one might have
expected based on a hard cases explanation alone.125 More tellingly, although
we generally found increases in the share of opinions with a concurrence or
dissent, these increases did not occur in the pattern that a hard-cases
mechanism operating alone would have implied.126
2. Concerning Appearances
A further theory is thus needed. We interpret the unusual and persistent
pattern observed as suggesting that these appeals courts were acting on a
super-priority—manifest in the aim of publishing at least as many
affirmances as reversals—while they also sought to limit the number of
opinions published altogether. The result of these competing pressures was
that published affirmances and published reversals often closely tracked

124 See Wald, supra note 18, at 1412-15 (describing the motivations of judges to write
concurring or dissenting opinions); see also Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, When to
Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1445, 1451-57
(2012) (noting the considerations that prompt judges to publish separate opinions).
125 It is possible, of course, that concurrences and dissents are more likely to be written in
reversals rather than affirmances. For instance, the existence of the lower court’s opinion may
make the authorship of a separate opinion less costly; or, the collegiality costs of a separate
opinion may be lower because a dissent in a reversal agrees with the trial judge unlike a dissent in
an affirmance. If there is such a differential, then it is hard to draw conclusions based on the first
clue noted in the text. The following analysis, however, which focuses on changes across the policy
shock rather than absolute levels, is more robust to this potential confounding factor.
126 Specifically, the increases in the shares of published opinions that include a concurrence,
a dissent, or both should be greater for affirmances than for reversals, given how much farther
affirmances fell. (That is, the denominator, or the total number of affirmances or reversals
published, fell farther for affirmances than for reversals; meanwhile, the numerators for each, or
the number of published decisions including a separate opinion, presumably should not have
changed as much, if the hard cases were being preserved for publication.) But we found no
noteworthy difference between the increase for affirmances and the increase for reversals.
On this point, however, it is worth noting that before the rule change, any case for which a
concurrence or dissent was written was presumptively publishable. The 1994 amendments
eliminated this presumption. Given that the presence of a concurrence or dissent no longer
equates to automatic publication, then the increased frequency we have observed may be
understating the increase in the incidence of “hard cases” in the body of published opinions after
the shock as compared to before. Note that such a distortion could in theory undermine the
conclusion we are drawing from our comparisons of this metric among reversals and among
affirmances—but only if this distortion were for some reason stronger for affirmances than for
reversals (so that our comparison understates the change in average incidence of “hard cases”
among affirmances more than among reversals).
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each other in number. (As noted above, we take care not to overstate the
rigidity of this heuristic.)127
To the extent that these appeals courts were influenced by a general
reluctance to allow the volume of affirmances to fall below the volume of
reversals in their visible corpus of published opinions, we speculate that this
aim was likely motivated by institutional concerns for signaling judicial
quality and a desire to preserve collegiality—a set of motivations one might
call reproach-aversion.128
If published opinions were lopsided in favor of reversals, they might
have created a perception that the trial courts were not getting the job
done.129 The “collective reputation” of the judiciary would suffer and so
might the relations between the appeals judges and the trial judges.130

127 Indeed, as we have already noted, the careful balance between publishing reversals and
publishing affirmances that existed in the Fifth District for much of our study period seems to
have unraveled by the end. See supra Figure 10. And in the Second District, although the tracking
of affirmances and reversals is extremely tight in the criminal docket, it is quite loose in the civil
docket. See supra Figure 7A. As also noted, we have observed this tracking pattern for some
individual judges (and to varying degrees), but not for others.
128 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
129 Court observers routinely use reversal rates only among published opinions to measure
the quality of a particular court. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., STATEWIDE CASELOAD
TRENDS: 2013 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, 2002–2003 THROUGH 2011–2012, at xvi-xvii (2013)
(tracking reversal rates only among cases disposed of by written opinion); Roy E. Hofer, Supreme
Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 8, 8
(using reversal rates among Supreme Court opinions to “grade” the federal circuit courts); Brad
Pauley, The California Supreme Court’s 2010 Affirmance Rates in Civil Cases Reveal Change and
Continuity, AT LECTERN: PRACTICING BEFORE CAL. SUP. CT. (Apr. 28, 2011, 8:35 PM),
http://www.atthelectern.com/the-california-supreme-courts-2010-affirmance-rates-in-civil-casesreveal-change-and-continuity, archived at http://perma.cc/3YKF-ANVJ (discussing the California
Supreme Court’s affirmance rates on review of civil cases from the various intermediate appellate
courts in 2010).
To be clear, we do not mean to endorse such statistics as measures of quality. For example,
the typical focus on reversal rates in published Supreme Court opinions ignores factors such as
certiorari procedures and other selective processes that precede the Court’s decisions. But
regardless of the accuracy of such measures, we hypothesize that it is the salience of the published
opinions that drives our suggested super-priority in the case of the Illinois appeals courts.
130 See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences and Reputation: Perspectives from
Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 453 (2009) (explaining “collective
reputation” in terms of “a judiciary that operates effectively [and thus earns] respect as a unit
within its own political system”); id. at 455 (“Each individual judge cares about his reputation with
the relevant audiences, but also about the reputation of the group as a whole . . . with external
constituencies. Collective reputation determines the status of the judiciary within the relevant
audience . . . .”); id. at 459 (“These constituencies might include the bar, academic
commentators, other branches of government, as well as political parties and others . . . .”). In
our context, we are describing the possibility that an appeals court might actively play a role in
influencing the collective reputation of the trial courts it oversees.
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Consider the unenviable position of those Illinois appeals judges who
sought to avoid creating such a perception of a weak trial bench. The true
affirmance rate was relatively high—above seventy percent.131 Yet this true
rate was obscured by the use of unpublished decisions, which at the time
were practically inaccessible to anyone not involved in the case itself (in
contrast to today’s easy online access to so-called unpublished opinions).
The frequency of affirmances among published opinions was thus far
more salient. But it was also likely to be lower than the (virtually invisible)
true affirmance rate because the criteria for publication tended to favor
reversals. Before the rule change, the appeals courts could nevertheless
signal the quality of the lower courts by choosing to publish—and thus
make visible—a large number of affirmances. Under the new rules, however,
the appeals courts became more limited in their ability to continue in this
practice. Still, at the very least, they could try to avoid the appearance that
trial court decisions were wrong more often than right. That is, the appeals
courts could still publish enough affirmances, as a sort of “filler,” so as to
prevent the number of published affirmances from falling below the number
of published reversals.132 One might even speculate that the caps imposed

131 Note that, in some quarters, even an 86% affirmance rate might be seen as a bad signal
about the quality of the trial bench. As Judge Jon Newman noted in the context of the federal
Second Circuit in the 1990s, “[a] district judge expressed the view that the reported rate of
appellate reversals, most recently said to be about 14%, demonstrated that something was seriously
wrong. As he put it, either the district judges are not doing their jobs properly (by making too
many errors) or the circuit judges are not doing their jobs properly (by reversing too many
decisions that are not erroneous).” Newman, supra note 103, at 630-31.
132 Such publication of extra opinions as “filler” would, of course, tend to undermine the
rationale for the rule change in the first place. Recall that a primary justification offered by
members of Illinois Supreme Court for the 1994 rule change was that the “avalanche of opinions”
taxed the capacity of the bar and imposed real costs in terms of legal research. Illinois Supreme
Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Bilandic, C.J., writing in support); id.
(Heiple, J., writing in support).
The costs of over-publication may be familiar to readers from the controversy over the
citation of unpublished decisions in the federal courts. Judge Kozinski, for instance, has lamented
the publication (for citation) of decisions that may not have received the same care and attention
as other published opinions. In addition to echoing the concerns raised by the Illinois Supreme
Court, he notes that such opinions, which are “often drafted entirely by law clerks and staff
attorneys” or “converted bench memo[s],” can be “highly misleading source[s] of authority.”
Letter from Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Samuel
A. Alito, Jr., Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4-6, 9-10, 11-13 ( Jan. 16,
2004), available at http://www.nonpublication.com/kozinskiletter.pdf (citing, among other things,
Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This!: Why We Don’t Allow Citation to
Unpublished Opinions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43, 44 and Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing
Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 12-13 (2002) (prepared statement of Hon. Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)).
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by M.R. No. 10343 gave the appeals courts an implicit sense of license to
publish extra affirmances up to the numerical cap.133
Notably, such a perception-management account may help explain why
the super-priority appears to have operated with greater force in the
criminal docket, at least in the Second District. If a court cared more about
perceptions of quality of the criminal justice machinery, then it might have
given greater care to matching the volume of affirmances to reversals among
published opinions in the criminal docket.
More generally, the tending of appearances in this way may have served,
in part, a legitimizing function that would otherwise have been served more
directly by actually publishing opinions—that is, by public reasoning—a
preferred method that had become more constrained under the amended
regime.134 If so, one might interpret such a substitution as a pragmatic
adaptation in judicial expression, a shift from substance toward form.
3. Collegiality and the Judicial Audience
A closely related set of further motivations may be grouped under the
heading of “collegiality.”135 Trial judges do not like being reversed,136 and
they surely like it even less when a reversal comes in the form of a
published opinion that names them individually and spells out their
mistakes in detail.137 How much more vexing it would be for the trial judges
if most of the opinions chosen for publication were reversals—while
133 Recall that these courts generally published significantly fewer opinions than the caps set
by the Illinois Supreme Court. See supra Section I.C.
134 Cf. Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1364-66 (1988)
(describing the varied audiences to and purposes for which judges write).
135 We do not mean to imply that these are competing or mutually exclusive explanations.
To the contrary, these explanations are closely intertwined and together form the “appearances”
super-priority that we have described above.
136 Such “reversal aversion” has been widely studied in the context of the federal courts. See
Choi et al., supra note 7, at 519-25 (surveying literature on what they term “reversal aversion”
among trial judges); id. at 518-19 (“Reversal is also potentially embarrassing and detrimental to a
trial judge’s prospects of promotion to the appeals courts.”).
137 Notably, in the tables listing unpublished decisions during the period we study, the trial
judge is not identified. A trial judge’s potential sensitivity to being reversed by name is reflected
in what Judge Patricia Wald described a “prevailing decorum” early in her career as a federal
appeals judge: “[I]f we upheld a trial judge, we referred to her by name; if we reversed the judge,
we left him anonymous.” Wald, supra note 18, at 1382. More generally, on the risk to collegiality
between appeals and trial judges due to reversals, see, for example, Newman, supra note 103, at 629
(“There is . . . an undeniable basis for some tension between judges of trial and appellate courts,
borne of the structural relationship in which they both function. Appellate judges have jurisdiction
to reverse the judgments entered by trial judges. When that authority is exercised, the potential
arises for some strain upon the normally cordial relationships between trial and appellate
judges.”).
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affirmances (which are in fact the vast majority of decisions) were hidden in
unpublished dispositions. Further motivating the aim of at least matching
published affirmances to published reversals, then, might be a concern for
preserving collegial relations between the trial and appellate judges in each
judicial district.138
Such collegiality-based motivations may also help explain why the
tracking pattern persists within certain breakdowns: These categories might
also map onto distinct “audiences” of judicial colleagues. That is, the appeals
court may be seeking to reassure specific groups of colleagues that they are
managing appearances in a way that promotes positive public perceptions of
each of those groups.139
For example, consider the subset of appeals that come from decisions of
the Industrial Commission, Illinois’s workers’ compensation system. Rather
than speaking to the trial courts, these appellate opinions speak directly to
the Industrial Commission—a distinct “audience.” And indeed, this small

138 Implied in this account is the perceived possibility of a “collegial cost” to an appeals court
that publishes reversals too frequently relative to affirmances (a cost to vertical collegiality
between the appellate and trial judges), as other scholars have studied about dissenting (a cost to
horizontal collegiality among appellate judges). See generally Epstein et al., supra note 29, at 103
(describing such a “collegial cost” from dissenting that manifests as “dissent aversion” among
appeals judges).
One might also imagine further variations of such a perceived cost to making trial judges look
bad through infelicitous publication choices. For example, the fact that the judges of the trial and
appellate courts in Illinois are elected might raise the stakes for managing perceptions of the trial
bench or of particular trial judges or for maintaining collegiality among judges. The influence of
such electoral politics may be dampened, however, by the fact that retention elections for these
judges (which happen every six years for the trial judges and every ten years for the appeals
judges) are uncontested and are generally understood to be of little risk for the incumbent. See
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d); Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964–2006, 90
JUDICATURE 208, 209 tbl. 1 (2007). Future work that includes data on the party affiliations of the
trial and appellate judges during this period may be able to test for same- and cross-party effects.
It is, however, telling that the super-priority we generally observe can also specifically be seen in
the subsample of cases appealed from rulings of the Industrial Commission, whose members are
appointed and not elected. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
139 Our account thus engages both “internal” and “external” audiences, or what one might
call “primary” and “secondary” audiences: the appeals court wishes to be seen by their trial court
colleagues (an internal or primary audience) as managing outward appearances (as perceived by
external or secondary audiences such as the bar or even the broader public). See Ruggiero J.
Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17-20 (2009)
(describing an appellate court’s “primary” audiences as the parties and the trial court involved in a
reviewed case, and “secondary” audiences as potentially the broader judiciary, other political
institutions, the bar, academia, and the public); Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 130, at 453
(describing “internal” audiences as “within the judiciary itself” and “external” as including
“lawyers, the media, or the general public”).
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subset of appellate opinions exhibits a similar pattern, suggesting that the
super-priority is at work here too.140
Likewise, for our criminal–civil distinction: Some of the trial-court
circuits employ a system in which criminal cases are directed to one set of
trial judges, and civil cases to another set.141 The distinction is formalized in
some trial-court circuits through the creation of a particular “criminal
division” of trial judges.142 In others, the separation is more informal, with
some trial judges hearing only one class of cases.143 But regardless of its
form, such division of cases creates distinct audiences of trial judges for the
appeals courts to consider when weighing collegiality concerns.144 The
existence of distinct audiences may thus help explain why the super-priority
seems to hold within our two major categories, as well as why we observe
the pattern repeated district by district.
CONCLUSION: SPILLOVERS IN JUDICIAL CHOICES
Our study suggests that for the sake of appearances the Illinois appellate
courts sought to balance their publication of reversals and of affirmances. If
so, then the choice to publish a given decision may have depended not only
on the qualities of that case alone, but also on which other cases had already
been published and, specifically, on how many were reversals and how many
were affirmances. The appearances super-priority thus implies spillover
effects among the courts’ publication choices in otherwise unrelated cases.145

140 See Appendix Figure 4. In fact, appeals from the Industrial Commission are heard by a
panel of diverse judges chosen from across the districts. That is, such a case might heard by a panel
comprised of a First, Third, and Fourth District judge, for example. This structure suggests one possible
mechanism by which the super-priority described above might have spread across the districts.
141 See, e.g., STATE OF ILL., CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, Judges Information,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/aboutthecourt/JudgesInformation.aspx (last visited May 11,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AP9M-KBLW (noting several “divisions” and the related
assignment of judges).
142 See, e.g., id. (showing a criminal division in the Circuit Court of Cook Country).
143 See, e.g., STATE OF ILLINOIS, FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SECOND AMENDED
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, available at http://www.fourthcircuitil.com/news/10-1.php (providing
judicial assignments and noting the types of cases assigned to each judge). Note that the Fourth
Circuit of trial courts is distinct from the Fourth District of the appeals courts.
144 One might also imagine that the courts are monitoring this norm within only one
category (say, criminal) as well as for the total corpus of opinions. This approach could generate a
similar pattern in the remaining (civil) category. If so, however, we might expect to see the latter
category (civil) occasionally having more reversals than affirmances, as it can absorb the occasional
excess of affirmances created by the first category. But we have not noticed this alternative pattern
in the data.
145 Two further forms of such interdependency are more obvious than the one revealed in
this study. First, that time constraints mean that the time spent on one opinion cannot be spent on
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Such a spillover would alter how we interpret the judicial choices we
observe. In fact, it would unsettle our own earlier conclusions in this study.
Recall our original finding that more criminal cases than civil cases appear
to have been deemed low-priority for publication under the new rules.146
But now consider the possible influence of the super-priority: what if the
number of opinions we observed being published were inflated by the
inclusion of affirmances serving only as filler? What really should be
compared as between criminal and civil cases, then, would be the
publication of reversals only.147 Through that more refined lens, we would
see that in all districts the publication of criminal reversals does in fact drop
disproportionately relative to that of civil reversals.148
But the implications of such a spillover go beyond matters of
interpretation. Whenever published reversals began to outnumber
published affirmances, these courts faced an unpalatable choice. At that
point, these courts could either dilute the case law with more affirmances
and thereby subvert the high court’s command to be selective about
publication, or they could suppress the publication of further reversals and
thereby create an artificial drag on the development of case law.
Either choice may have been preferable, however, to the more troubling
spillover effect suggested in the Introduction. These courts could have
satisfied their higher-level priorities of selectivity and of appearances by
sacrificing accuracy instead—that is, by publishing only case-law-worthy
opinions, while switching some of those reversals to affirmances. The reason
these courts could hold fast to the super-priority of accuracy, and avoid
managing appearances by distorting actual outcomes among the cases set for
publication, is the strong asymmetry of visibility that existed at the time
between published and unpublished decisions of these courts. The truly
unavailable nature of the unpublished opinions allowed these courts to
decouple accuracy from appearances, in deploying the judicial medium. By
contrast, today’s so-called unpublished opinions are widely available in the
another; and second, that if one opinion on a given legal issue is published, then a second case
addressing the same issue may become redundant.
146 Or more precisely, that a larger share of opinions in criminal cases were disqualified by
the higher bar for publication.
147 The reason is that the super-priority implies that observing the number of published
affirmances may not be informative about the relative publication-worthiness of civil versus
criminal cases.
148 This conclusion would be narrower because we would no longer be drawing conclusions
about affirmances, and thus, no longer about the priorities put on criminal versus civil opinions as
a whole. One exception should be noted, however, in the Fourth District: to the extent that its
formal cap actually constrained its publication choices, then this shift of attention to data solely
about the reversals would not be necessary.
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federal courts and in many state courts. Such universal visibility may have
its advantages, but in theory it may also force the tradeoff between accuracy
and appearances—implying the possibility of spillovers across the actual
outcomes of cases.
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Appendix Table 1: Annual Reports of the Illinois Courts and
Westlaw Data, 1991–1997

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Opinions
Annual Reports
of the Illinois Courts
Rule 23
Orders

Westlaw Dataset

2284 2234 2196 1678 1070 1098 1006
3380 3331

3592 4558 4696 4421 4805

Summary
Orders

—

—

Total

5664 5565 5788 6236 6758 6624 6627

Opinions

2007 1971 1899 1436 946

Table
Decisions
Total

3323 3245 3499 4318 5392 5165 5257

Westlaw Total as a
Percent of Reported Total

—

—

992

1105 816

958

885

5330 5216 5398 5754 6338 6123 6142

94.1 93.7 93.3 92.3 93.8 92.4 92.7
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Appendix Figure 1: Number of Total Dispositions,
All Districts
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Appendix Figure 3: Publication Rate (by Outcome),
All Districts
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Appendix Table 2: Change in Published Opinions by Outcome
Before

After

Changes

All Districts

Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

3412
2394

1487
1329

-56.4%
-44.6%

1st District

Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

1580
977

816
645

-48.4%
-34.0%

2nd District

Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

613
470

233
252

-62.0%
-46.4%

3rd District

Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

430
317

133
129

-69.1%
-59.3%

4th District

Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

485
337

211
165

-56.5%
-51.0%

5th District

Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or Partial)

304
296

94
138

-69.1%
-53.4%
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Appendix Table 3: Change in Published Affirmances by Case Type
Affirmance Type

Before

After

Changes

All Districts

Criminal
Civil

1340
2072

440
1047

-67.2%
-49.5%

1st District

Criminal
Civil

640
940

208
608

-67.5%
-35.3%

2nd District

Criminal
Civil

267
346

77
156

-71.2%
-54.9%

3rd District

Criminal
Civil

167
263

47
86

-71.9%
-67.3%

4th District

Criminal
Civil

163
322

86
125

-47.2%
-61.2%

5th District

Criminal
Civil

103
201

22
72

-78.6%
-64.2%
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Appendix Table 4: Change in Published Reversals by Case Type
Reversal Type

Before

After

Changes

All Districts

Criminal
Civil

806
1591

347
982

-56.9%
-38.3%

1st District

Criminal
Civil

313
664

163
482

-47.9%
-27.4%

2nd District

Criminal
Civil

166
304

65
187

-60.8%
-38.5%

3rd District

Criminal
Civil

123
194

43
86

-65.0%
-55.7%

4th District

Criminal
Civil

120
217

43
122

-64.2%
-43.8%

5th District

Criminal
Civil

84
212

33
105

-60.7%
-50.5%

Appendix Figure 4: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,
Appeals from the Industrial Commission
25
Affirmances
Reversals (Whole or
Partial)

20

15

10

5

0

2015]

1769

Judicial Priorities

Appendix Figure 5A: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge A
(Fifth District)
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Appendix Figure 5B: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge B
(Fifth District)
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Appendix Figure 5C: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge C
(Fifth District)
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Appendix Figure 5D: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge D
(Fifth District)
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